Abstract. The explosive growth of data-traffic, for example due to the popularity of the Internet, poses important emerging network requirements on today's telecommunication networks. This paper describes how core networks will evolve to Optical Transport Networks (OTNs), which are optimised for the transport of data-traffic, resulting in a IP-directly-over-OTN paradigm.
Considering the expectation that in the long term the peer-model will become mature enough and eventually overtake the overlay-model (when IP-MPLS becomes the service integration layer), we propose as horizon for our roadmap a peer-modeled IP-MPLS/OTN-MPλS network. Note that this is the horizon of our roadmap, not the end of network evolution. There are already ideas to drive the switching granularity even higher (waveband switching or even fiber switching) and intensive research is going on in the field of Optical Packet Switching.
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Enhancing survivability features of the G-MPLS technology for IP and OTN networks
It was already mentioned that the decoupling in MPLS of routing and forwarding opens opportunities for Traffic Engineering (TE). This is in particular true for the resilience aspects in TE. The goal of this section is to
give a brief summary of the current proposals for network recovery in MPLS networks. The impact of G-MPLS is also studied. The reader is referred to [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] , [26] , [27] , [28] , [13] , [29] , [7] , [30] for more detailed information (terminology is not fixed yet and therefore we use our own terminology in this paper).
Note that this section is focussing on resilience in a single layer (thus MPLS or MPλS): multi-layer issues are presented in a later section. The section is divided in protection and restoration, referring to the fact whether an alternative path is pre-established or not.
Restoration in MPLS
Restoration typically means that connections affected by a failure are routed along an alternative path that is calculated and set-up at the time of the failure: a big advantage of restoration is its flexibility. MPLS rerouting is an example of restoration. MPLS rerouting relies on the dynamic IP routing protocols. Failures are detected by adjacent routers (e.g. endpoints of a failing link) and advertised/flooded over the network, in order to allow other routers to take this topology change into account. After updating its routing tables, a router somewhere in the network may notice that it has LSPs leaving along another interface than indicated by the routing table entries corresponding to the destination of these LSPs. This will trigger the setup of LSPs along the correct (as indicated by the routing table) path.
One of the drawbacks of MPLS rerouting is that it may suffer from similar inefficiencies as the IP routing protocols on which it is relying: e.g., rather long convergence times, temporary instabilities and loops, etc.
Therefore, a new MPLS restoration scheme was developed at our department: the so-called Fast Topologydriven Constraint-based Rerouting (FTCR): see Figure 4 . It assumes that the MPLS network runs a link-state routing protocol (e.g., OSPF or IS-IS): this means that each link is advertised to all routers in the network and that each router stores all these advertised links in its link-state database (which gives an overview of the topology). A router detecting a failure immediately knows that it has to calculate an alternative route for the LSPs leaving over the dead interface and it may do this based on its current view of the network topology, Submission for IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, special issue on WDM-BASED NETWORK ARCHITECTURES stored in its link-state database. The router simply removes the failing equipment from the link-state database and calculates a new route from itself towards the egress LSR: this implies that the part of the LSP upstream from the failure is not rerouted. Explicit routed setup of the LSP (i.e. specifying, in the label requests, each hop to be transited by the LSP) along this calculated alternative path is required (e.g., by means of Constraint
Routed -LDP (CR-LDP)), since other routers may not be already aware of the failure. Later on, the IP routing protocol can continue converging/stabilizing and in the meanwhile leave the already restored LSPs alone. The principle of FTCR is illustrated with more detail in [24] , [23] , [22] . The fact that MPLS restoration sets up the LSP along the alternative path, at the moment that the failure occurs, requires only standard control plane functionality for the setup and tear down of connections. Even more, this remains true for MPλS (or any circuit-switched technology in G-MPLS). Restoration also allows sharing spare capacity between several failure scenarios. Figure 5 .
Protection in MPLS

Path Protection
Easy merging of working/back-up Local Protection typically suffers from the fact that per link/node a backup LSP is required for each primary LSP. Workarounds (resulting in a single backup LSP per link for all working LSPs over that link) [30] are proposed in case label stacking is allowed and labels have a platform-wide significance. Label stacking is used to multiplex multiple LSPs into a single aggregate LSP: this is achieved by placing an additional label (e.g., shim-header) corresponding to the aggregate LSP, in front of the label of the multiplexed LSPs. Platform-wide label significance means that a label-space exists per LSR instead of per interface. Path Protection on the other hand, suffers from the fact that it cannot perform the protection switch locally, which requires additional signaling functionality and which results in a longer interruption of the affected services or a larger amount of lost data.
The best characteristics of both protection schemes can be combined into another scheme, which we call Local Loop-Back (see Figure 7 ). The idea is that a single backup LSP in the opposite direction of the primary LSP allows performing the protection switch locally. Therefore, the backup LSP consists of two parts: a reverse part, allowing the local protection switch, and a diverse part from the ingress to the egress, in order to get the protected traffic on the backup LSP through the network.
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Unfortunately, this is not always the case: one may opt to send unequipped signals over a link, in order to keep the power budget on that link as constant as possible. Also, signal degradation may trigger upstream a protection switch, while the degraded primary signal is still flowing through the network. To overcome this problem one may prefer to switch from one signal to the other one, as in classical 1+1 Protection. However, this switch has to be synchronized with the status in the Protection Switch LSR. 
Survivability Issues in Multi-layered Networks
Our roadmap in section 1 shows that data-centric optical-networks typically consist of multiple layers, even in the simplified case of IP-MPLS directly over OTN-MPλS. This section starts with a discussion on the provisioning of recovery functionality in multi-layer networks. These concepts and discussion are focussed on a two-layer network, but are generic and thus applicable to any multi-layer network. This section ends with some survivability considerations specific to IP-MPLS directly over OTN-MPλS networks.
Single layer survivability strategies and their drawbacks
Section 2 gave an overview of recovery techniques applicable to MPLS or G-MPLS (e.g., MPλS) networks.
However, it did not tackle the problem in which layer to apply one of these techniques (e.g. in MPLS or in
MPλS for an IP-MPLS/OTN-MPλS network). This section discusses cases where recovery is foreseen at the bottom (e.g., OTN-MPλS) or at the top (e.g., IP-MPLS) layer.
Survivability at the bottom layer
Recovery at the bottom layer has the advantage that a simple root failure has to be treated and that recovery actions are performed on the coarsest granularity, resulting in the lowest number of required recovery actions.
Also failures do not need to propagate through multiple layers before triggering any recovery action.
However, there is no recovery scheme residing in the bottom layer that can resolve any problems due to a failure in a higher layer: any layer above or the layer where the failure occurs itself has to resolve the problem. 
Survivability at the top layer
Another strategy is to provide the survivability at the top layer. The advantage of this strategy is that it can cope more easily with node or higher layer failures (see Figure 10) . A main drawback of this strategy is that it needs many recovery actions, due to the finer granularity of the flow entities in the top layer. However, treating each individual flow at the top layer allows differentiating between these flows, based on their (service) importance. Or in other words, the top layer may restore critical, high priority traffic before any action is taken on low priority flows. This is not possible in lower layers, since they switch every flow in an aggregate signal with a single action. Under certain conditions, the finer granularity may also lead to a more efficient capacity usage. First of all, aggregate signals, poorly filled with working traffic, have enough capacity to transport spare resources. Secondly, the finer granularity allows distributing flows over more alternative paths. However, a trade-off exists between a better filling of the capacity of the logical links and the higher amount of higher layer equipment, when comparing this survivability at the top layer strategy with the survivability at the bottom layer strategy.
Not only the potential mismatch in granularity between the failing equipment in a lower layer and the thereby affected entities in the top layer, requiring more recovery actions, is an issue. Also the typically complex Submission for IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, special issue on WDM-BASED NETWORK ARCHITECTURES secondary failure scenarios, as a result of a single root failure in a lower layer, can become a problem. This is illustrated in Figure 11 .
Server Client
Figure 11: explains that a single root failure may propage to many so-called secondary failures.
Slightly different variants: survivability at the lowest detecting layer and survivability at the highest-possible layer
A slightly different variant on the survivability at the bottom layer is the survivability at the lowest detecting layer strategy (i.e. the lowest layer in the hierarchy able to detect the failure). This means that multiple layers deploy a recovery scheme, but that still the (single) layer detecting the root failure is the only layer taking any recovery actions. With this strategy, there is no problem anymore that the bottom layer recovery scheme does not detect a higher layer failure (because the higher layer which detects the failure will recover the affected traffic). However, this survivability at the lowest-detecting layer strategy can assure that traffic transiting the failing equipment is restored, but it still suffers from the fact that it cannot restore any traffic transiting higher layer equipment isolated by a node failure. The client layer in Figure 10 deploys a recovery scheme in this strategy, but the considered traffic flow is still lost, since this client layer recovery scheme is not triggered by the node failure in the server layer. This strategy is considered as single layer survivability strategy, although it considers the deployment of a recovery scheme in multiple layers. The reason is that for each failure scenario the responsibility to recover all traffic is situated in one and only one layer (the one detecting the failure).
A slightly different variant of the survivability at the top layer strategy is the survivability at the highest possible layer strategy. Since not all traffic has to be injected (by the customer) at the top layer, a traffic flow is recovered in the layer in which it is injected (or in other words the highest possible layer for this traffic flow).
For example, a data-centric optical network may also support a leased optical channel service. This strategy is also considered as a single layer survivability strategy, although it considers a recovery scheme in multiple Submission for IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, special issue on WDM-BASED NETWORK ARCHITECTURES layers. Indeed, survivability at the highest possible layer may lead to recovery schemes in multiple layers, but never to recover the same traffic flow. Actually, for each traffic flow a survivability at the top layer strategy is deployed (or in other words, both strategies do not differ in essence from each other).
Multi-layer survivability: concepts and solutions
The conclusion from the previous section is that both survivability at the bottom/lowest detecting and top/highest possible layer have their pros and contras. However, it is likely that a real network will combine the advantages of both approaches. Or in more general, that the choice in which layer to recover the traffic will depend on the circumstances (e.g., the occurring failure scenario). This requires a higher flexibility than the simple rules on which the single layer survivability strategies are based (always all recovery actions in the lowest (i.e., lowest detecting/bottom) layer or always in the highest (i.e., highest possible/top) layer).
Uncoordinated approach
A first solution is to deploy a recovery scheme in multiple layers, without any coordination, resulting in parallel recovery actions at distinct layers. Consider for example the link failure in Figure 12 The main advantage is that this solution is simple from an implementation (e.g., no standardization of coordination signals between both layers is necessary) and operational point of view. However, Figure 12 shows the drawback of this strategy. Both recovery mechanisms occupy spare resources during the failure (i.e., the server layer along A-E-D and the client layer along a-b-c, which implies occupation of spare resources on A-B and B-C in the server layer), although one scheme occupying spare resources would be sufficient. This implies that potentially more extra traffic (i.e. unprotected pre-emptable traffic) is squelched (disrupted). Or even worse, consider that the server layer reroutes the logical link a-d over the path A-B-C-D instead of A-E-D, then both recovery mechanisms need spare capacity on the links A-B and B-C. If these higher layer spare resources are supported as extra traffic in the lower layer, then there is a risk that this client layer spare resources are pre-empted by the recovery action in the server layer, resulting in "destructive interference". Or rephrased, the two recovery actions taken were not able to restore the traffic, since the client layer reroutes the considered flow over the path a-b-c, which was disrupted by the server layer recovery. [16] illustrates that these Submission for IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, special issue on WDM-BASED NETWORK ARCHITECTURES risks may exist in real networks: they prove that a switch-over in the optical domain (e.g., for protection purposes in the optical network) may trigger traditional SDH protection. 
Client
Sequential approach
A more intelligent approach, compared to the uncoordinated approach, is the sequential approach, where the responsibility for recovery is handed over to the next layer when it is clear that the current layer is not able to fulfill the recovery task. There exist mainly two approaches:
1. Bottom-up approach: the recovery starts in the bottom/lowest detecting layer (where the failure is detected) and all traffic which cannot be restored by this layer (e.g., due to capacity shortage), will be restored by a higher layer. The advantage of this approach is that recovery actions are taken at the appropriate granularity (recovery actions on a finer granularity, in a higher layer, are only taken when necessary) and complex secondary failures are treated only when needed.
2. Top-down approach: is the other way around. Recovery actions are initiated in the top/highest possible layer and only if the higher layer cannot restore all traffic, lower layer actions are triggered. An advantage of this approach is that a higher layer can more easily differentiate traffic with respect to the service types Submission for IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, special issue on WDM-BASED NETWORK ARCHITECTURES and thus it may try to restore high priority traffic first. A drawback of this approach is that a lower layer has no easy way to detect on its own, whether a higher layer was able to restore traffic or not (an explicit signal is needed for this purpose).
The remainder of the paper assumes the bottom-up approach (since this is the most intuitive one), except when explicitly referring to the top-down approach. An example of the bottom-up approach is shown in Figure 13 .
The server layer starts with attempting to restore the logical link a-d, but it fails since this logical link terminates on the failing node D. Therefore, the client layer recover scheme is triggered to restore the considered traffic flow a-c, by rerouting it over node b instead of node d. (which is failing) and thus the server layer cannot restore the traffic carried on these links. Therefore, the recovery scheme in the client layer will be triggered in one or another way. This scheme will recover the traffic transiting the isolated node d.
The implementation of these escalation strategies (i.e., handing-over the responsibility for recovery from one layer to the other one) is another issue. Two solutions are described here.
• The first one is based on a hold-off timer. A hold-off timer is set at the moment the server layer starts attempting to restore the traffic. If this hold-off timer goes off and (part of) the traffic is not restored, then the client layer will take over the recovery actions while the server layer ceases its attempts. The main drawback of a hold-off timer is that higher layer recovery actions are always delayed, independent of the failure scenario.
• To overcome this delay, another escalation strategy is the use of a recovery token signal between layers.
This means practically that the server layer sends the recovery token (by means of an explicit signal) to the client layer from the moment that it knows that it cannot restore traffic anymore. A disadvantage, compared Submission for IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, special issue on WDM-BASED NETWORK ARCHITECTURES to a hold-off timer interworking, is that a recovery token signal needs to be incorporated in the standardization of the interface between network layers.
A hold-off timer is probably less appropriate for a top-down approach, since the lower layer should be notified with an explicit signal whether the higher layer managed to restore the traffic or not.
Integrated approach
The integrated approach is based on a single integrated multi-layer recovery scheme. This implies that this recovery scheme has a full overview of all the network layers and that it can decide when and in which layer (or layers) to take the appropriate recovery actions. It is obvious that an integrated approach is the most flexible one. However, to profit from this high flexibility, one has to provide the necessary algorithmic intelligence/complexity. Another issue is the implementation/realization of such an integrated approach. It is unlikely to develop a single recovery scheme, controlling and having an overview of all network layers, in current overlaid networks.
Summary and conclusions
Section 3.1 discussed the shortcomings of single layer survivability strategies. Section 3.2 illustrated how to overcome these shortcomings by providing survivability at multiple layers. Table 1 gives a summary of the estimated performance, with respect to several characteristics, for some survivability strategies. [31] , [32] illustrates that the spare resource requirements can be reduced for the case of multi-layer survivability, by supporting higher layer spare resources as extra traffic in the lower layer spare resources (i.e., the common pool of spare resources). However, section 3.2.1 explained that a proper coordination of the recovery schemes becomes absolutely necessary in such a case.
Specific IP-MPLS/OTN-MPλS opportunities and drawbacks
The goal of this section is to highlight some specific survivability opportunities and drawbacks that arise in case of an IP-MPLS directly over OTN-MPλS network. Note that the previous sections, on generic multi-layer survivability strategies, remain true for IP-MPLS/OTN-MPλS multi-layer networks: this section only provides some additional considerations, which may be taken into account when designing such an IP-MPLS/OTN-MPλS network.
Section 2 illustrated that MPLS is suitable to provide fast protection switching in the IP-MPLS layer. Therefore, one could opt to promote recovery in the IP-MPLS layer (i.e., promote survivability at the top/highest possible layer (e.g., [33] ) or a top-down strategy) as this has some favourable properties. First of all, less spare resources are needed in the IP-MPLS layer, since packet-switching is very suitable to share spare capacity amongst preestablished backup paths (while keeping the advantages of fast protection switching). Secondly, dropping lowpriority (e.g., best-effort) traffic first is inherently incorporated in IP-MPLS networks, if for example Diffserv is deployed [34] .
Another opportunity relates to the integrated approach, mentioned in section 3.2.3. As described in our roadmap in section 1, we expect that a peer-modeled data-centric optical network may become a reality in a longer-term future. If this becomes true, then a single integrated multi-layer approach would become much more feasible than in current overlaid networks, due to the single integrated control plane of a peer-modeled network.
Finally, the automation of the lightpath setup/tear-down process in an Automatically Switched Optical Transport Network (ASON) doesn't require anymore to stick with a fixed logical (IP-MPLS) topology and capacity. This opens opportunities for the re-optimization of the logical topology during a failure condition.
Even more, an at least node bi-connected logical (IP-MPLS) topology is no absolute necessity anymore to survive any single failure. For example, if a router would fail (potentially resulting in a disconnected IP-MPLS network), an automatic reconfiguration of the logical IP-MPLS topology (instead of traditional rerouting (i.e., protection/restoration) of traffic) would restore the connectivity of the IP-MPLS network.
A main drawback of current IP-MPLS network is that failure detection is based on the periodic exchange of HELLO-messages between adjacent routers. If no HELLOs are received anymore through an interface, then the only conclusion can be that the opposite side of the interface is unreachable or in other words that each packet sent through the interface is sent into a black hole. But this detection scheme does not allow to differentiate 
Case studies on Survivability in IP-MPLS directly over OTN-
MPλS networks
The goal of this section is to present some case study results, which deal with survivability in data-centric 
Typical network scenarios
A typical IP-MPLS network consists of a meshed core network containing a few dozens of backbone IP-MPLS routers. Attached to those backbone routers are regional networks that concentrate the traffic from the access part of the network into the core part. While the core part of the network has a meshed structure, the structure of the access part of the network could be described as tree structures, as illustrated in Figure 14 . Also attached to the IP-MPLS network are large server farms, containing the data for e.g. video-on-demand or web-based services. They are one of the reasons of the highly asymmetric character of IP traffic (e.g., video-on-demand:
small customer request stream in the upstream direction, large video-data stream in the downstream direction) [36] .
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Recovery at MPLS or/and at the MPλS layer?
An important issue in this whole paper is in which layer to provide a recovery scheme. The goal of this section is to present some quantitative study results, which may help to answer this question.
A first study investigates the amount of required spare resources, relative to the amount of working resources.
The previous section and section 2.2 explained that MPLS protection results in shared protection when applied at the electrical MPLS layer, and in dedicated protection at the optical layer. The goal of our study is to investigate the significance of this effect, by comparing the results for both cases. Figure 15 also reveals that (in case of Local Protection) the topology has a significant impact and more precisely that the topology with the smallest nodal degree suffers the most from this dedication. This result can be understood intuitively as follows. If a topology becomes sparser, backup LSPs for adjacent failure scenarios (e.g., two adjacent links in case of link protection) tend to become longer and more overlapping (for instance, think about the extreme case of a ring topology to sense this). This explains why the penalty of dedication is severe in sparse networks, less in dense networks. These observations are confirmed by the study in Figure 16 investigating the impact of the (nodal degree of a) topology on the relative cost increase due to the dedication of MPLS protection in the optical domain. The conclusion is that fast MPLS protection in the electrical MPLS layer is cheaper than similar schemes in the optical transport network and that the cost increase for Local Protection in the optical layer could be very severe, due to the typical sparse topologies of transport networks. Another issue is whether the dominant data traffic (typically based on TCP) prefers fast protection switching.
Assume that one wants to profit from the advantages of fast protection switching in the electrical MPLS layer.
Submission for IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, special issue on WDM-BASED NETWORK ARCHITECTURES Then, there may be a risk that switching a large amount of traffic (e.g., a complete 10Gbps line) immediately (i.e., before the TCP-mechanism gets the chance to slow down) would drastically impact other flows in the network. Indeed, as TCP is reactive in nature, not only the flows being switched to an alternative backup path will be affected, but also the other flows (already present on (parts of) the backup path). To gain a better understanding of these kind of interactions, and the role of the exact timing of the protection switch, a simulation study was carried out.
The setup of the simulation is depicted in Figure 17 . We consider a backbone network of Label Switched Routers (LSRs) to which we connect access nodes via links having a bandwidth that is 90% of the backbone links. In the thus created network we set up two categories of flows. The so-called "switched flows" will follow the path crossing LSRs 4, 5, 6 and 7 when there is no link failure; upon the failure of link 5-6, a protection switch will be carried out at LSR 5 and the followed path will be 4-5-9-10-6-7, as indicated by the dotted line in Figure 17 . The other category, the "fixed flows", will always use the path over LSRs 8, 9, 10 and 11. The simulation scenario consists of three periods of 5 seconds: during the first and third, all links will be up, whereas during the second period link 5-6 will fail. To investigate the influence of timing, the protection switch will be performed "manually" exactly δ seconds after the occurrence of the link failure. From a qualitative point of view, the influence of δ can be easily predicted. If δ is set to zero, the switched flows will join the fixed ones at LSR 9 at a time when they are both sending at a quite high rate (limited only by the bandwidth of the access links). This will result in an almost immediate buffer overflow at LSR 9, causing a burst of a fairly high number of losses, afflicted on both flow categories. Introducing a small delay (δ strictly positive) will inflict losses during that period of δ on the switched flows only, thereby forcing them to back off Submission for IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, special issue on WDM-BASED NETWORK ARCHITECTURES (cf. TCP window size reduction in response to losses) before being switched to the alternative path. As a result, the immediate buffer overflow at LSR 9 will be avoided and the fixed flows will be approached more "gently":
a buffer overflow at LSR 9 will occur at a later time, and will cause fewer losses compared to the δ=0 case. In Figure 18 , the evolution of goodput over time is depicted. There we clearly see the heavy impact (i.e. serious drop in goodput) of the immediate buffer overflow for δ=0 on the fixed flows. To decide what delay δ results in the "best" behaviour from a quantitive point of view, we decided to use TCP goodput as a decision criterion. Indeed, goodput is what an end user cares about: it is the amount of data successfully transported end-to-end during a certain time interval (expressed in e.g. bytes/s). We ran simulations using random start times for the TCP sources, and randomly generated propagation delays for the first access links (in order to introduce diverse Round Trip Times or (RTTs) for different source-destination pairs). For each of the thus created 150 random cases, we ran simulations for five different values of δ (0, 50, 250, 500 and 1000ms) tracing TCP goodput. We compared the different values of δ by plotting the histogram of the ratio f(δ)=Good(δ)/Good(0), where Good(δ) is the total goodput -attained by the whole of fixed and switched flows -during the first 1.5 seconds after the link failure for delay δ (we chose 1.5s as we intended to focus on the smaller delays, and this is the relevant period for those cases). These histograms (and corresponding normal fits)
are depicted in Figure 19 . That graph shows that, on average, all cases of δ result in a better overall goodput than having no delay at all (δ=0).
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It can be concluded that pushing fast protection switching to the limit (i.e. extremely fast) may not be the best thing to do. However, to decide upon the "best" time to perform the protection switch, is not easy. It depends at least on the link load (in the case presented above, when all links are up, backbone links are loaded for max.
90% due to the limits in the access part, but a protection switch results in a sudden load of almost 180%), the Submission for IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, special issue on WDM-BASED NETWORK ARCHITECTURES RTT experienced by the TCP sources (larger RTT means slower response to topology changes), the number of concurrent TCP flows (larger number results in faster stabilisation, up to a certain limit).
However, the results presented above seem to indicate that from a practical point of view, it is not harmful to have fast protection (order of tens of milliseconds) for TCP traffic. This conclusion is probably even more true if we believe that backbone links carry a vast amount of concurrent TCP flows (cf. faster stabilisation than small number of flows, and therefore optimal delay shifts towards δ=0) and/or are fairly underloaded. Indeed, when backbone links do not form the bottleneck for TCP flows, interaction between switched and fixed flows will be limited. Other simulations showed that in this latter case (e.g. for an access link bandwidth being 60% of the backbone bandwidth), the optimal protection switch delay clearly shifts to lower values (towards δ=0). The simulations carried out so far, seem to indicate that only if the timescale of protection switching is well below 50ms, TCP effects may call for a stop to the efforts to minimise it. All this however does not imply that extremely fast protection switching is a must for TCP: the differences in goodput for delays in the range 0-250ms do not differ all that much, especially when the number of TCP flows is large.
The simulation discussed above considered fast protection at the MPLS layer. However, if fast protection is offered by lower layers (e.g. MPλS), we are in an altogether different situation. Indeed, in that case we will have no interaction between competing TCP flows (as we assume that the capacity for protection is reserved, and is fully available from the very instant the protection switch is carried out).; clearly, dynamic behavior of TCP in response to packet losses will still occur. In this case, the intuitively clear conclusion we have drawn from a first series of simulations is: the faster the protection switch at the optical layer is performed, the better (from a TCP goodput point of view). The simulations performed for this case had a link going down for a certain amount of time δ, without any protection actions taken at the MPLS level. For 140 random cases (random RTTs, etc., as before) and δ in {0, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 250, 500, 1000 ms} we saw that in 94% of the cases, δ=0 was the best (only packets in transit on failing link are lost); in the remaining 6% of the cases, δ=5ms
was the best (which is due to details in dynamic TCP behaviour in some rather peculiar cases). Thus, the avoidance of TCP interactions is an advantage of protection at the MPλS layer and means that even extremely fast protection switching at that layer does not seem to pose any problem (at least from TCP point of view).
We can conclude this section, by saying that from a capacity point of view protection in the MPLS layer is preferable compared to MPλS protection. However one has to be careful when performing fast protection Submission for IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, special issue on WDM-BASED NETWORK ARCHITECTURES switching in the MPLS layer, since TCP may behave in such a way that its goodput slightly reduces when switching too fast. Thus this section illustrates that such a decision is far away of being straightforward.
Case Study: Design of a Multi-layer Survivable MPLS/OTN Network
The concept of survivability in a multi-layer network is illustrated here with an example. The network under study is an MPLS over OTN network [37] . Both layer networks are shown in Figure 20 . The MPLS layer contains 16 routers, connected by 33 logical links. Attached to the routers of the major cities are servers that contain the application data (e.g., video data for the video-on demand service). The topology resembles a multiple star topology, with the heart of each star in a router connected to a large server (farm). The OTN layer Protection [38] In our design, the OTN layer was chosen to provide resilience against expected failures (this includes single link and node failures). However, as described in Section 3. The cost is modeled as the sum of the number of wavelengths needed on the various links multiplied by the link length. Important here is also the assumption that all OXCs are able to perform wavelength conversion.
A first conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that the use of 1+1 Protection in the OTN layer leads to the most expensive solution, 1.7 to 1.8 times more expensive than restoration (in the case where no MPLS protection mechanisms are used). Path Restoration is in this case the cheapest solution. A second result is that the introduction of MPLS Local Protection has a serious impact on the overall cost. On average, the network cost increases with a factor 1.4 due to its use. In this case the extra cost of 1+1 Protection compared to restoration is even higher: 1.9 to 2 times more expensive. Again, Path Restoration is the cheapest solution. Of course, the network is now also protected against MPLS router (isolating) failures, which was not true in the former case. However, part of the cost increase can be explained by the fact that spare resources are now needed in both layer networks. This results in what is called redundant or double protection: spare resources in the OTN layer also protect spare resources from the MPLS layer, which is superfluous. This can be avoided by supporting the MPLS spare resources as unprotected traffic in the OTN. Even better results can be obtained by adopting a multi-layer survivability strategy based on the common pool concept [31] , [32] . The basic idea behind this concept is to support higher layer spare resources as unprotected pre-emptible traffic in the lower layer network.
Conclusions
A roadmap has been outlined in this paper, showing how current core networks will evolve from a rather complex IP/ATM/SDH/WDM towards a simplified IP-directly-over-OTN paradigm. In particular the survivability features of such data-centric optical networks have been investigated. Special attention has been paid to the application of MPLS recovery techniques.
Since a data-centric optical network contains at least an IP-MPLS layer and an optical layer, one of the main questions to be answered was: "In which layer to provide survivability features?". It was shown that each layer has its pros and cons. Therefore, a likely solution seems to be providing survivability at multiple layers, in order to combine the advantages of these layers. However, in order to avoid inefficiencies or conflicts between these layers, the recovery actions of these layers may require coordination. Therefore, in addition to the uncoordinated approach, a sequential (e.g., by means of a hold-off timer or recovery token) and an integrated approach have been proposed.
Submission for IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, special issue on WDM-BASED NETWORK ARCHITECTURES Finally, some case studies illustrated the relevance of those multi-layer survivability issues. One of the conclusions was that MPLS protection allows fast recovery of traffic at the electrical MPLS level and even more that this is typically cheaper than MPλS protection, but that protection switching at the MPLS level may have a negative impact on TCP goodput during a rather long period (in the order of a (few) second(s)) after the failure and the protection switch. Another case study illustrated that protecting against MPLS router failures, while trying to recover as much traffic as possible in the OTN, without appropriate precautions, may have a significant negative impact on the overall network cost.
